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PROFESSIONALISM AND THE CHAINS OF 
SLAVERY 
Redmond J. Barnett* 
JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS. By 
Robert M. Cover. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
1975. Pp. xii, 322. $16.50. 
THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS. By Don E. Fehrenbacher. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 1978. Pp. xii, 741. $25.00. 
Obedience to law often seems incompatible with loyalty to 
conscience, and professionalism may sometimes obstruct justice. 
Critics have long been suspicious of the legal profession on exactly 
these points, and some have lately accused the professions in 
general of supporting self-interest and class-interest, defensive-
ness and oppression. I In The Culture of Professionalism, for ex-
ample, Burton Bledstein remarks that: "[T]he culture of profes-
sionalism in America has been enormously satisfying to the 
human ego, while it has taken an inestimable toll on the integrity 
of individuals."2 If charges like this are true, at least a quarter of 
all employed Americans-the professionals-stand in considera-
ble moral danger. 3 
Such claims cry for analysis, and a good place to begin is the 
intersection of professional institutions and behavior with a social 
situation that raises profound moral questions. The legal history 
of slavery in the nineteenth-century United States is such an 
intersection. Although neither of the books under review scruti-
nizes professionalism, both use it as a foundation for argument. 
The works exemplify the value of seeing concepts in relation to a 
* Assistant Professor of History, University of Puget Sound. A.B. 1965, A.M. 1966, 
Ph.D. 1973, Harvard University.-Ed. 
1. See, e.g., Barzun, The Professions Under Siege, HARPER'S, Oct. 1978, at 61-68; 
Glazer, The Attack on the Professions, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1978, at 34-41, and the works 
cited therein. See also I. Ir.LICH, DESCHOOLlNG SOCIETY (1971), and, for a sampling of 
relevant issues, see T. HAsKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE 
AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE AsSOClATlON AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY 
chs. 1-2 (1977); THE PROFESSlONS IN AMERICA (K. Lynn ed. 1965). 
2, B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSlONALlSM: THE MlDDLE CLASS AND THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION 1N AMERICA xi (1976). 
3, UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AllsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
1977, at 406 (April 1977) (including 13.7 million "professional and technical" and 9.3 
million "managers and administrators" in a labor force of 89.3 million). 
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particular set of concrete events, instead of tracing their amor-
phous intellectual history. But partly because neither book exam-
ines its own conceptual underpinnings, the two are utterly incom-
patible. To oversimplify only slightly,· Robert Cover maintains 
that slavery reveals the moral dilemma and ultimate moral bank-
ruptcy of professionalism; Don Fehrenbacher, professionalism's 
moral excellence. Cover's story is the anguished collaboration of 
the most professional American judges with slavery; Fehren-
bacher's, the demonstration that greater professionalism could 
have prevented judicial complicity with slavery. For one, profes-
sionalism is a poison; for the other, a cure. As is so often true of 
the study of history, a closer look raises profound questions with 
exciting and perplexing implications. 
I 
Cover poses the problem with an example that few can ig-
nore: Herman Melville's short novel, Billy Budd. In that unset-
tling work, the innocent sailor Budd's action of killing the evil 
petty officer Claggart, who had falsely accused him of mutiny, 
posed a cruel dilemma for Captain Vere and his officers: Would 
they free a sailor who had violated the Mutiny Act by striking his 
superior officer, or kill a man innocent of :mutinous intent? How 
could they square law and conscience? More poignant yet, Mel-
ville's father-in-law was Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice of the high-
est court in Massachusetts from 1830 to 1860, author of strong 
antislavery decisions, who nevertheless returned fugitive slaves to 
the South.4 Cover describes Billy Budd as posing the dilemma of 
antebellum Northern judges, personally opposed to slavery but 
committted by their professional roles to rivet new chains on 
escaped slaves. 
In Cover's view, judges' roles as professionals significantly 
determined their actions, and their roles made them inhumane. 
Though Cover does not mention it, the prototype of such inhu-
mane professionalism could be the United States Sanitary Com-
mission in the Civil War: In the interest of disciplining troops, the 
Commission withheld medicine from wounded soldiers if it had 
not been requested through the correct formal procedures. 0 The 
picture that emerges from Cover's pages is that Northern judges 
were tragic, noble, but irrational figures reluctantly sacrificing 
4. R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 4-5 (1975). 
5. G. FREDRICKSON, THE INNER CIVIL WAR: NORTHERN INTELLECTUALS AND THE CRISIS 
OF THE UNION 104-05 (1965). 
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their morals to the idols of professional expertise. They valued 
both freedom and law, liberty and union, and the conflict of those 
values drove them nearly mad. As Cover says, "Make no mistake. 
The judges we shall examine really squirmed; were intensely un-
comfortable in hanging Billy Budd. But they did thejob."6 Impli-
cations for our time are not accidental: Cover reports that he 
began writing when colleagues objected to his seeing similarities 
between judges in the 1960s who approved the Vietnam War and 
judges of the 1850s who returned fugitive slaves. 7 The charges he 
makes against legal professionals are grave, bolstered with 
thoughtful and respectful argument, and deserve reflective con-
sideration. 
II 
In its conclusions and its method, Don Fehrenbacher's mag-
isterial book intimates that professionalism promotes integrity 
and sustains humane values, while unfaithfulness to forms pro-
motes irrationality and oppression. The work towers above the 
author's modest prefatory claims that "I have no sense of being 
immune from this plague of inaccuracy that seems to afflict stu-
dents of the Dred Scott decision. My best hope is that I may have 
corrected some tiresome old errors and made some interesting 
new ones. "8 It exhaustively examines the Dred Scott case, fre-
quently but tactfully corrects predecessors' errors, and speaks 
with unrivalled authority. Fehrenbacher makes a convincing ar-
gument that the case was not a collusive lawsuit, that the two 
dissenting Justices of the Supreme Court did not force the major-
ity to render a broad decision, and that the decision did not 
undermine respect for the Court.9 Nor did it break up the Demo-
cratic party, or propel Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency. 10 Dred 
Scott himself was not shiftless and unreliable; Roger Taney was 
not a closet abolitionist.11 The Chief Justice's opinion was not 
dictum, nor was he normally an apostle of judicial self-restraint. 12 
Like the restorer of a house damaged as much by incompetent 
repair as by neglect, Fehrenbacher patiently removes the "new 
layers of confusion" added by "efforts at clarification by several 
6. R. COVER, supra note 4, at 7. 
7. Id. at xi. 
8. D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DREo ScoTr CASE ix (1978). 
9. Id. at 251-52, 270-76, 572; 308-12; 573-80. 
10. Id. at 455-58, 561-67. 
11. Id. at 571-72, 653 n.3, 714 n.7; 560. 
12. Id. at 331-34, 231-35. 
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generations of scholars."13 Many of his questions are deceptively 
simple: What exactly were the legal issues? What did the Court 
decide? What consequences followed? Supplementing a careful 
text with helpful diagrams, he patiently corrects errors, weighs 
suggested explanations, and reaches considered judgments likely 
to be persuasive. 
In Fehrenbacher's hands, traditional professional methods of 
political history support antislavery moral judgments. A careful 
account of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 demonstrates that the 
Constitution did not require active federal involvement in recap-
turing fugitives: relying on state action, as in the extradition of 
criminals, would have sufficed.14 A meticulous study of black citi-
zenship sharply notes the inconsistency of forbidding free blacks 
to bring lawsuits on the ground that they lacked some rights of 
citizens (like voting), while permitting suits by corporations and 
white women and children, who also lacked some rights of citi-
zens.15 Convincing documentation underlines the pervasive as-
sumptions by Northern as well as Southern whites that blacks 
were inferior. 16 
The book's organization mirrors the author's description of 
the case as one of those "sharply defined historical events through 
which, like the neck of an hourglass, great causal forces appear 
to flow, emerging converted into significant consequences."17 The 
first third of the volume describes the history and politics of 
slavery and characterizes the judicial style of the Taney Court; 
the second describes the case itself from Dred Scott's early wan-
derings to the opinions of the Court; the final third describes the 
consequences, both immediate and remote. Fehrenbacher thus 
places the decision in both a synchronic context, where it be-
comes a window onto American attitudes and actions of the 
1850s, and a diachronic one, looking back to the colonial years 
and forward to the twentieth century. 
Viewed in larger terms, the case speaks to issues of law and 
morals across our entire history as an independent nation. Feh-
renbacher ends his text in the present with an eye to the future 
by citing a poll conducted by the American Bar Association 
Journal in 1974 that chose the fourteen most important Supreme 
13. Id. at 323. 
14. Id. at 40-47. 
15. Id. at 64-73. 
16. Id. at 190-91, 428-39, 489. 
17. Id. at 3-4. 
Jan.-Mar. 1979] Professionalism and Slavery 659 
Court cases. Only one came from the years between 1819 and 
1935: Dred Scott. Why was there such "great importance thus 
attached to the Dred Scott decision by members of the American 
legal profession in the later twentieth century ... "? Presumably 
because this first decision declaring a significant general act of 
Congress unconstitutional was, "in the long run . . . most signifi-
cant as an epoch in the growth of American judicial power" -of 
which "we have yet to comprehend the full meaning .... " 18 If 
its present and future are important to professionals, its origins 
reveal something of the struggles to reconcile morals with inter-
ests. The Founding Fathers, Fehrenbacher admits, never gave 
slavery systematic consideration, and the Constitution back-
handedly acknowledged the institution while anticipating its pos-
sible abolition: "It is as though the framers were half-consciously 
trying to frame two constitutions, one for their own time and the 
other for the ages, with slavery viewed bifocally-that is, plainly 
visible at their feet, but disappearing when they lifted their 
eyes."19 Indeed, many grains flow through the neck of the Dred 
Scott case, and find their place before the reader's eyes. 
The heart of Fehrenbacher's method is simple, unrevolution-
ary, and anything but flashy: the precise analysis of texts and 
situations, noting their ambiguities while finding their main 
thread. He seeks underlying patterns without losing sight of com-
plexities and inconsistencies. What he says of the slavery clauses 
in the Constitution is typical of his entire approach: "Yet if the 
text and historical context of the three clauses fail to reveal a 
clear intent, their want of coherence does not entirely obscure a 
certain elemental drift or tendency. " 20 His is professional conserv-
atism that keeps thrusting basic questions of values to the fore. 
The historian's method invites comparison with the methods of 
antebellum judges in general, and of Roger Taney in particular. 
III 
Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford21 frequently de-
parted from neutral professional canons of construction. The 
departure was not quite total: Fehrenbacher credits the Chief 
Justice with making sound technical rulings on certain jurisdic-
18. Id. at 594-95. 
19. Id. at 19-27, quotation at 27. 
20. Id. at 26. 
21. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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tional and procedural questions. 22 But Taney's choice of subjects 
and his manner of treating them reveal his unprofessional con-
cerns. He gave a disproportionate amount of space-forty-four 
percent of his total opinion, twenty-four times the space he gave 
to discussing the effects of Scott's residence in Illinois-to argu-
ing that blacks were not citizens and presumably possessed no 
rights of citizens, even those not at issue in the litigation. 23 Pecu-
liar on professional grounds, this disproportion makes sense in 
light of the rising Southern white concern about the challenge to 
slavery implied by free blacks, of the Southern attack on the 
antislavery movement, and of Taney's own formal opinion as 
Attorney-General in 1832, which concluded that "The African 
race in the United States even when free" had privileges but no 
rights whatsoever.24 
More important than this imbalance in space, Taney's treat-
ment played fast and loose with the Constitution's language. The 
Chief Justice repeatedly slipped from one logical category to an-
other, implying that emancipation did not change the status of 
blacks, reading the term "regulation" as weaker than "law," and 
changing "Congress" into "independent sovereignties. " 25 He used 
words without regard for their normal meanings, claiming that 
eight out of thirteen states was "all," that the statement, "The 
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and im-
munities of citizens in the several states" meant that a person 
"may have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a State, 
and yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in 
any other State," and that "the words 'free inhabitants' . . . did 
not include the African race, whether free or not."20 He simply 
failed to discuss one constitutional clause that told against his 
argument. Tl He blithely asserted that free blacks in the 1770s and 
1780s had "no rights which the white man was bound to respect," 
ignoring the rights they undoubtedly enjoyed to hold property, 
marry, make contracts, and sue.28 Though Fehrenbacher scrupu-
lously notes that Taney's contemporary and later critics mis-
judged his words-he ascribed that opinion to the public in the 
1770s, not himself-the historian demonstrates that Taney's 
22. D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 331-33, 338-39. 
23. Id. at 337, 340-64, 385-86. 
24. Id. at 340-41, 70. 
25. Id. at 343, 346-54, 368-69, 371. 
'26. Id. at 371, 344 (quoting Taney), 358 (quoting Taney). 
27. Id. at 352-53. 
28. Id. at 347-49. 
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opinion described no difference between the 1770s and the 1850s. 
A year and a half after the Dred Scott decision, Taney wrote an 
unpublished "supplement" to his opinion affirming more pre-
cisely that whites' belief in their own superiority was "as plain 
now as it was in the days of the assiento [early eighteenth cen-
tury]. " 29 As in 1832, his white supremacist beliefs infected his 
decision. 
Taney did not even behave with complete propriety towards 
his fellow Justices: After delivering his opinion orally, he rewrote 
it to outflank some of the dissenting Justices' objections, length-
ening it by about fifty percent.30 He discussed the case with Presi-
dent James Buchanan, and worked with Buchanan to convince 
one Northern Justice to concur with him.31 Further, he quarrelled 
so strongly with one dissenter-who, to be sure, had released the 
text of his own dissent to the newspapers-that the latter re-
signed from the Court.32 Fehrenbacher's description of Taney's 
additions, visible in the page proofs in the National Archives, is 
a fine bit of detective work.33 All in all, the Chief Justice's per-
formance is not what one expects from a professional jurist. 
What, then, accounts for Taney's behavior? While Fehren-
bacher does not attempt to play the psychohistorian, he does note 
that in 1855, less than five months before the arguments in the 
Dred Scott case, Taney's wife and daughter died in circumstances 
that surely made him feel guilty and involved his beliefs about 
the South. He had effectively forbidden his daughter's going 
North for the summer, proclaiming that her wish was "nothing 
more than that unfortunate feeling of inferiority in the South, 
which believes everything in the North to be superior to what we 
have. " 3~ While the family was staying at Old Point Comfort, near 
Baltimore, a yellow fever epidemic killed his daughter and a 
stroke killed his wife. A relative described Taney as being "in 
tears like an infant, and he has given way to the most bitter self 
reproaches, for keeping his family at the Point in reliance on his 
ownjudgment."35 Although noting the suggestion of Taney's biog-
rapher that these deaths "deprived him of the emotional reserves 
necessary to preserve . . . judicial balance," Fehrenbach er pre-
29. Id. at 347-48, 445-48, quotation at 447. 
30. Id. at 315-16, 320-21 (detailed list of additions). 
31. Id. at 311-14. 
32. Id. at 314-18, 670 n.30. 
33. Id. at 320-21. 
34. Id. at 558. 
35. Id. at 559. 
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fers to interpret the decision as an example of Southern nonslave-
holding whites' attitudes:36 
Like the Chief Justice, a majority of southerners had no significant 
economic stake in the institution of slavery, but they did have a 
vital stake in preservation of the southern social order and of 
southern self-respect. In the end, it may have been the assault on 
their self-respect-the very language of the antislavery cru-
sade-that drove many southerners over the edge. . . . With in-
creasing frequency and bitterness . . . , southerners protested 
that they were being degraded by northern sanctimony. Taney's 
Dred Scott decision . . . is a document of great revelatory value. 
In the very unreasonableness of its argument one finds a measure 
of southern desperation.37 
Here, perhaps, Fehrenbacher's caution about novel methods 
of interpretation may unduly impoverish his account. John 
Mack's recent biography of T. E. Lawrence shows that reasonable 
concern for a subject's psychological development is compatible 
with treating larger, public issues, as Erik Erikson has longmain-
tained.38 On Fehrenbacher's own showing, Taney's opinion con-
tained a more "extraordinary cumulation of error, inconsist-
ency, and misrepresentation, dispensed with such pontifical self-
assurance" than those of his concurring Southern Justices.au 
James M. Wayne (Georgia) did not bother to file most of his 
opinion at all.40 John A. Campbell (Alabama) ignored part of 
Taney's opinion, seemed to be sticking close to precedent, and 
used strict, if slightly bizarre and confusing, construction.41 John 
Catron (Tennessee) "flatly disagreed" with parts of Taney's opin-
ion, privately described the whole account of Negro citizenship as 
dictum, briefly concurred with Samuel Nelson's opinion that had 
omitted several issues raised by Taney, and seems to have written 
with little rancor.42 Only Peter V. Daniel (Virginia) resembled 
Taney, "with a mind completely closed on the slavery issue," and 
even he "reached the same conclusion as Taney but by a shorter 
and straighter path," and made fewer misreadings and omis-
sions. 43 Moreover, Daniel was "prostrated for months" by the 
36. Id. at 559-61 (quoting C. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD 722 (1974)). 
37. Id. at 561. 
38. J. MACK, A PRINCE OF OUR DISORDER: THE LIFE OF T.E. LAWRENCE (1976); E. 
ERIKSON, INSIGHT AND RESP0NSIBIIJTY 201-08 (1964). 
39. D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 559. 
40. Id. at 389-90. 
41. Id. at 395, 396-98, 400-01. 
42. Id. at 395, 401, 390, 396, 401-03. 
43. Id. at 398, 395-96. 
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"horrible death" of his young wife, who one month before the 
decision burned to death when her clothing caught fire. 44 Com-
pared with his Southern colleagues, Taney was less rational. 
The Chief Justice's greater bitterness does seem in need of 
an explanation, and his psychological state seems relevant. Feh-
renbacher gives us some tantalizing suggestions that add up to a 
portrait of Taney as the odd man out, who overcame his isolation 
by forcefully reiterating his own convictions and, if possible, rid-
ing roughshod over all opposition. Contemporaries ·complained of 
his "infernal apostolic manner," and one likened him to the Pope, 
"speaking 'ex cathedra, infallibly.' " 45 His Roman Catholic and 
Federalist affiliations were unpopular with the majority of his 
countrymen. He was ugly and ill. What gave him the power to 
hold his audience was "the force of his reasoning and conviction." 
His great triumph had been as an executioner, killing the Bank 
of the United States for Andrew Jackson by removing government 
deposits from it. In 1856, he privately warned that the South was 
doomed unless it could completely suppress its internal dissent.46 
On the Supreme Court, unlike John Marshall, he failed to effect 
the compromises necessary for the Justices to agree on a single 
opinion: Multiple concurring opinions, as well as dissents, be-
came common. 47 
The events of 1855 could well have encouraged this well-
developed tendency to inflexibility and insensitivity, especially in 
a case involving Southern honor. Since his love for the South had 
destroyed his daughter and wife, Taney needed some way of put-
ting the family behind him or reaffirming the South's value. His 
selling the family home in Baltimore and never again visiting the 
site of his family's deaths was one way;48 defending Southern 
claims and slavery more forcefully than before, another. As we 
shall see, this suggestion that inconsistencies between two 
strongly held beliefs impelled an intense response closely resem-
bles Robert Cover's explanation for the tortured intensity of 
Northern judges and the proposal by Charles Sellers, Jr., that 
inconsistencies between slavery and American values promoted 
emotional upheaval among Southerners generally.49 
44. Id. at 679 n.2; 668 n.2; 305. 
45. Id. at 649 n.40 (no date), 227 (1861). 
46. Id. at 227, 557-58. 
47. Id. at 228. 
48. Id. at 559. 
49. Sellers, The Travail of Slavery, in THE SOUTHERNER AS AMERICAN 40 (C. Sellers 
ed. 1960). 
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Perhaps because Fehrenbacher does not explicitly scrutinize 
professionalism, he does not ask, "Was there something about 
this judge's professional style that made him act so unprofession-
ally?" Hence his explanation is consistent with two different 
views. One assumes that professionals had the task of controlling 
an irrational or unjust public: It directs attention to conditions 
under which the public escapes from its leash, to Southern society 
rather than judicial character. In the case at hand, it absolves 
professionals from blame, seeing them as swept away by a rising 
emotional commitment to the Southern way of life, and finds the 
close study of professional values and personal character irrele-
vant. Though seeming to favor that view, Fehrenbacher does not 
completely deny the alternative: that professionals can be irra-
tional and hold inconsistent values. From this perspective, the 
shifting balance within a judge's mind seems more important 
than external conditions. This internal approach is closer to 
Cover's analysis of Northern judges and Thomas Kuhn's ap-
proach to scientists.so Applied to the case at hand, it directs at-
tention inwards, to the ways that judges internalize the values of 
their profession, not outwards to the society. A more rounded 
portrait of Taney, one with greater attention to the interaction 
between his psychic and public lives, might better suggest how a 
professional jurist could come to behave so unprofessionally, and 
therefore how strong professional commitments were. A great 
work of scholarship raises new questions and makes them ripe for 
further inquiry: Fehrenbacher's book fulfills these functions ad-
mirably. 
What Fehrenbacher has done, in effect, is to write a profes-
sional's brief, reminiscent of the work of nineteenth-century an-
tislavery lawyers like Montgomery Blair (Scott's counsel) or Wil-
liam Jay.st Fehrenbacher makes a strong argument that adher-
ence to neutral principles of construction and precedent would 
have freed Scott, while their violation by impassioned judges fas-
tened the slaves' manacles more firmly. This view frees profes-
50. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SctENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS chs. 5-10 (2d ed. 1970). 
51. On Blair, see D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 281-82, 286-88, 295-301. Several 
passages in The Dred Sc_ott Case make the same arguments as W. JAY, INQUIRY INTO THE 
CHARACTER AND TENDENCY OF THE AMERICAN COLONIZATION, AND AMERICAN ANTl·SLAVEltY 
SOCIETIES (6th ed. N.Y. 1838) (1st ed. N.Y. & Boston 1835). Compare D. FEHRENBACHER, 
supra, at 360, on the three-fifths clause with W. JAY, supra, at 39-40; D. FEHRENBACHER, 
supra, at 343, on black citizenship with W. JAY, supra, at 41-42; D. FEHRENBACHER, supra, 
at 65, on the insertion of "white" in the Articles of Confederation with W. JAY, supra, at 
42. 
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sionalism from its alleged service as a handmaid of the ruling 
class; instead, behaving according to the forms of a profession 
becomes a means of insuring integrity. Fehrenbacher's own man-
ner of writing mirrors the book's content, and both argue the 
virtues of conservative judicial statesmanship. In more than one 
sense, The Dred Scott Case is a judicious book. 
N 
Justice Accused denies that professionalism supported integ-
rity. Cover's key concept is "the moral-formal dilemma": "the 
choice between the demands of role and the voice of con-
science. "52 Faced with a fugitive slave, he says, Northern judges 
needed to choose whether the moral rules served by antislavery 
were consistent with what Cover calls the formal considerations 
of judges; if not, and they generally were not, the formal consider-
ations took precedence. Northern judges thus acted as had Cap-
tain Vere. 
Cover gives the term "formalism" more sociological content 
than did Morton White in his classic study of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes and others, Social Thought in America: The Revolt 
against Formalism. White used the term to mean "ab-
stractionism," or "logic, abstraction, deduction, mathematics, 
and mechanics" as opposed to "the rich, moving, living current 
of social life": an intellectual or attitudinal pattern. 53 In contrast, 
Cover's "formal principles" are less intellectual than sociological 
or anthropological: "the role of the judge," "the hierarchical char-
acter of the judicial system," "the standards of professional re-
sponsibility," and "the sense of the judicial craft."5~ For those, 
the term "professional" would seem as appropriate as the term 
"formal." 
Northern judges, says Cover, invoked these formal, profes-
sional concerns more and more after the 1830s, when antislavery 
lawyers and their opponents increasingly forced them to consider 
the moral-formal dilemma. Judges tried to escape the dilemma 
by "elevation of the formal stakes" ("the tendency to choose the 
highest of possible justifications for the principle of formalism 
relied upon"-for example, that failing to return the slave would 
52. R. CoVER, supra note 4, at 6, 197-99. 
53. M. WHITE, Soc!AL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE R.EvoLT AGAINST Fom,IALISM 12, II, 
3 (2d ed. 1957): 
54. R. COVER, supra note 4, at 197. 
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disrupt ordered American society).55 They tried to escape by a 
"retreat to a mechanistic formalism" (interpreting ambiguous 
principles as "crystal clear demands from Constitution, Congress, 
and Supreme Court").56 They tried to escape by "ascription of 
responsibility elsewhere" (proclaiming judicial helplessness and 
suggesting that other branches of government, or the people, bore 
the responsibility).57 Each of these strategies relied on professedly 
neutral professional principles. 
To explain why judges adopted formalism, Cover invokes a 
psychological model of cognitive dissonance, which I have implic-
itly adopted above in discussing Taney: the strain of believing in 
inconsistent propositions, such as fidelity to morality and to the 
legal system, or respect for the South and love for family. 08 This 
strain supposedly led judges to remove the contradiction by glori-
fying formalism, making it more mechanical, and blaming others. 
One of the most exciting parts of Cover's book is his close reading 
of appellate opinions for evidence of psychological stress of the 
sorts predicted by dissonance theory. True, the portraits of Jo-
seph Story, John McLean, and others remain too flat to carry 
much conviction: looking at their lives outside their slave cases 
would put their characters into sharper perspective. 00 True, other 
psychological models would usefully supplement the dissonance 
one. Still, Cover's readings point the way to using legal opinions 
as psychological documents and deserve a more extended discus-
sion than this review can give them. 
In short, Cover and Fehrenbacher disagree. For the latter, 
professional formalism was yoked to morality: the moral-formal 
dilemma did not exist. For Cover, professional formalism allowed 
immorality: the moral-formal dilemma was crucial. Faced with 
incompatible views, we would do well to look more closely. Let 
us examine Cover's analogy to Billy Budd, the importance of 
natural law, and Southern judges' decisions in change-of-
residence cases. 
The Billy Budd Analogy 
Although Cover's invocation of the Billy Budd analogy is 
55. Id. at 199 & n., 229-32. 
56. Id. at 199, 232-36, quotation at 233. 
57. Id. at 199, 236-38. 
58. Id. at 226-29 (relying heavily but not exclusively on L. F'EsTINGER, A THEORY OF 
CooNmVE DISSONANCE (1957)). 
59. R. COVER, supra note 4, ch. 13, (especially 238-58); app. at 260-67. 
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civiliz~d, literate, stimulating, interdisciplinary, and hence ad-
mirable, is it on point? True, Melville himself raises the dilemma 
between conscience and law. He has Vere recognize "a troubled 
hesitancy, proceeding, I doubt not, from the clash of military 
duty with moral scruple," has the captain demand of his officers: 
"But do these buttons that we wear attest that our allegiance is 
to Nature? No, to the King," and makes him clinch his argument: 
"War looks but to the frontage, the appearance. And the Mutiny 
Act, War's child, takes after the father. Budd's intent or non-
intent is nothing to the purpose."60 
But was Budd's intent "nothing to the purpose"? Someone 
like Fehrenbacher might argue that the court should promote the 
policy behind the Mutiny Act, not necessarily the literal words 
of that document. He might reject Vere's unsupported assertion 
that "War looks but to ... the appearance." Vere and Melville 
agree that Budd was in fact innocent of intent to violate the 
policy of the Act, whose framers sought to punish mutineers. 
Since Budd was not a mutineer, respect for the legislature's pol-
icy would seem to require releasing him. In contrast, the authors 
of the Fugitive Slave Law intended to return escaped slaves. 
Since an escaped slave brought before Lemuel Shaw was in fact 
guilty of the act that legislators sought to punish, respect for the 
legislature's policy required Shaw to return him to his master. Of 
course there were important procedural questions about whether 
a particular defendant was in fact a fugitive and whether a state 
judge should help in the rendition process, and in a cosmic sense 
both Budd and the fugitives were innocent. But of the specific 
crime proscribed by the legislature, Budd was innocent and the 
fugitives guilty. Because of this difference, Vere's (and Cover's) 
naive dichotomy between nature and buttons, conscience and 
role, does not fully illuminate the dilemma of the antislavery 
judges. Those judges had more complex choices than Vere or 
Cover recognize. 
Moreover, Vere justifies disregarding Budd's intent on 
grounds other than legal formalism. His sailors-"the people" as 
he calls them, using the same word that slaveholders often used 
for their slaves-"long molded by arbitrary discipline, have not 
that kind of intelligent responsiveness that might qualify them to 
comprehend and discriminate." Sailors in other warships in 1797 
had mutinied; his sailors "would think that we flinch, that we are 
60. H. MELVILLE, BILLY Buoo: SAILOR (AN INSIDE NARRATIVE) 110-12 (H. Hayford & 
M. Sealts eds. 1962). 
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afraid of them-afraid of practicing a lawful rigor . . ,i lest it 
should provoke new troubles."81 In effect, Vere is arguing that the 
preservation of a ruling class, one that has made its subjects 
incapable of reasonable discourse and logical thinking, justifies 
undermining the legislature's stated aims. Thus Vere's ultimate 
justification is not in terms of legal formalism, but of protection 
for a privileged group. This orientation towards relationships of 
power in the society at large transcends the categories "formal" 
and "moral" and directs one away from professional values to-
wards social relationships. In the hands of a historian like Eugene 
Genovese, this orientation towards external social relationships 
challenges psychological explanations. Slaveowners believed as 
they did, Genovese suggests, not because they were paralyzed by 
conflict among values, but because they accurately perceived ex-
ternal threats to their power. 82 
Although Cover does not explicitly deny the importance of 
social power, neither does he think it important enough to dis-
cuss. His summation of Part ill, "The Moral-Formal Dilemma," 
maintains "that it was the performance of troubled men in trou-
bled times as well as the juristic competence of their age that 
determined the almost uniform response of the antislavery bench 
to the call for liberty."83 "Troubled men in troubled times" is 
hardly specific, so the principal explanation comes down to "the 
juristic competence of the age." By this term, Cover means the 
"jurisprudential tools of an epoch," what Thomas Kuhn has iden-
tified and popularized as a paradigm: the assumptions underly-
ing a profession that tell its practitioners what questions, an-
swers, and procedures are legitimate.64 In.Cover's words, tools "do 
not determine or generate specific answers to particular prob-
lems, but they do determine the universe of viable responses. "00 
Neither Kuhn nor Cover holds irrelevant the pressure on practi-
tioners from the larger society, but both give much greater weight 
to assumptions within the professional group. A bit more willing-
ness to look beyond the profession at the larger social context in 
which Captain Vere and Billy Budd lived would, I think, enrich 
Cover's reading of Melville's story. For Vere does not ultimately 
commit injustice for the sake of the law, as the moral-formal 
61. Id. at 112-13. 
62. E. GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY! STUDIES IN THE ECONOMY AND 
SocJETY OF THE SLAVE SoUTH chs. 1, 10 (1965). 
63. R. COVER, supra note 4, at 258-59. 
64. Id. at 258; T. KUHN, supra note 50, at 10-22, 174-91. 
65. R. COVER, supra note 4, at 258. 
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dilemma would have us believe: Vere takes an innocent life to 
preserve his own social group's power and privilege. Vere's di-
lemma is not exactly "the choice between the demands of role 
and the voice of conscience": his personal stake in ari unjust 
social order informs his judicial actions. For Cover to have placed 
the moral-formal dilemma squarely in that context, instead of 
making ambiguous comments like "the King is but a symbol for 
a social order," would have made his analysis more penetrating 
and might have suggested a more complex model for antebellum 
judges.66 
Natural Law and Positive Law 
In terms of Northern jurisprudence, the moral-formal di-
lemma appears most vividly in Cover's pages as a conflict be-
tween natural law and judicial positivism. Observing that explicit 
legislative enactments and judicial· decisions supported slavery, 
and that natural law potentially challenged these positive laws in 
the name of universal principles of justice, Cover suggests that 
Americans' growing understanding of law as command instead of 
declaration of eternal principles shaped decisions into a proslav-
ery configuration. Rulings enslaving blacks thus followed from 
the basic formal principles of the antebellum legal profession. 
In the nineteenth century, as in the 1780s, Cover maintains, 
"the language of natural law came easily," and natural law was 
fundamentally antislavery.67 Reflecting a tradition older than 
Justinian, English and American jurists commonly said that slav-
ery was contrary to natural law; the American Revolution's liber-
tarian rhetoric further encouraged American judges to invoke 
natural law in concrete cases. 68 As Cover points out, lawyers cited 
natural law when Massachusetts abolished slavery in the early 
1780s.69 In 1822, Joseph Story invoked natural law to uphold the 
American seizure of a French slave ship.70 In a proslavery treatise 
on the law of slavery three decades later, T. R.R. Cobb admitted 
that most courts agreed that slavery was contrary to natural law.71 
Even though the tradition of natural law had often accommo-
dated slavery, as David Brion Davis has shown, there is little 
66. Id. at 4. 
67. Id. at 9. 
68. Id. at 9-22. 
69. Id. at 8, 44-50. 
70. Id. at 101-02. 
71. Id. at 98. 
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room to doubt that when nineteenth-century judges invoked nat-
ural law, they usually recognized that it told against bondage. 72 
Thus, any criticism of natural law at least undermined a basis for 
opposing slavery, and thereby strengthened the institution. 
Along with respect for natural law, antebellum Americans 
accepted a sometimes antithetical principle: that law was the 
explicit, positive expression of lawmakers' will. Americans as-
sumed that law emanated from the sovereign people, in constitu-
tional conventions and legislatures; written constitutions and 
laws limited judicial discretion.73 Cover lucidly suggests the gen-
erally accepted antebellum relationship between natural and pos-
itive law: although natural law existed independently of human 
action and declared what was just, it took on legal authority only 
as positive lawmaking action adopted it. Useful as natural law 
might be as a standard for judging legal rules, it remained subor-
dinate to positive expressions of lawmakers' wills, such as consti-
tutions, statutes, and precedents. 74 With some reason, Cover 
argues that this respect for positive legislation, the philosophical 
attacks on natural law by David Hume, Edmund Burke, and 
Jeremy Bentham, and the political attacks on judicial discretion, 
weakened respect for natural law.75 "Gradually, from 1780 to the 
eve of the Civil War, the natural law condemnation of slavery 
came to mean not a common cultural tradition but a personal ( or 
at least, party) preference."76 
Since positive legislation quite frequently supported slavery, 
Cover's dichotomous formulation suggests looking at efforts to 
challenge positive law with natural law. Cover discusses only two 
groups which made that challenge. Followers of the abolitionist 
William Lloyd Garrison argued that judges had to be faithful to 
professional roles, but should resign if those roles required immo-
ral decisions. This advice was the special case of the Garrisonian 
prescription that the moral man should withdraw from immoral 
government.77 Cover's second group is one that he felicitously 
names "constitutional utopians"-Lysander Spooner, Alvan 
Stewart, and others-who maintained that "the Constitution 
72. D. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REvOLUTION 1770-1823, at 262 
(1975); D. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 69-72, 94-97, 109 (1966). 
73. R. COVER, supra note 4, at 25-28, 33-35. 
74. Id. at 34-35. 
75. Id. at 22-25, 140-47. 
76. Id. at 30. 
77. Id. at 150-54. 
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outlaws slavery, even in Alabama."78 They defended this conclu-
sion by bizarre readings of law: Stewart, for example, argued that 
the Constitution legalized only slavery that resulted from pres-
entment by a grand jury and conviction by a petit jury. As Cover 
rightly observes, positions like this were eccentric, their argu-
ments depending on "the haphazard ingenuity of rule and phrase 
manipulation." The antislavery alternatives that Cover recog-
nizes, thus, were bleak: Judges could resign, or they could enforce 
"natural law, preferably through a forced reading of positive law 
instruments, but if need be, as an act of naked power." Not 
surprisingly, "neither of these solutions promised widespread ac-
ceptance by the men who sat on the bench."79 
Cover offers paired alternatives: positive law or natural law, 
methodological normality or eccentricity, the formal horn of the 
moral-formal dilemma or the moral horn. Since judges preferred 
to be normal rather than eccentric, they embraced positive law 
and formalism, rejecting natural law and morality. But of course 
they still felt the power of what they had rejected. Faced with the 
mutual incompatibility of natural law and legal professionalism, 
Cover affirms, they felt guilty, enslaved the fugitives, and justi-
fied their actions in shrill tones. 
Like most dichotomies, this is plausible but not fully con-
vincing. It seems too ready to identify natural law and the consti-
tutional utopians as the only alternatives to judicial enslavement. 
In fact, as Cover too briefly notes, there was another alternative, 
. one close to Fehrenbacher's position: that the Constitution pre-
scribed only a limited federal support of slavery. Sticking close 
to texts and neutral principles of construction, judges could have 
read the fugitive-slave clause as forbidding state interference 
with slave extradition, rather than as requiring state or federal 
aid to slave catchers; the commerce clause could have authorized 
regulation of the interstate slave trade; slavery need not have 
been allowed in the District of Columbia. The group that William 
Wiecek identifies as "moderate constitutionalists" criticized the 
federal government's policy of defending slavery beyond minimal 
constitutional requirements, policies for which Cover provides an 
elegant phrase, "gratuitous complicity with slavery."80 The 
78. Id. at 154-58, quotation at 156. 
79. Id. at 157-58, quotations at 157, 158, 158. 
80. W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 1760-
1848, at 15-16 (1977); R. COVER, supra note 4, at 155; see D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, 
at 40-43, 37. 
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"moderate constitutionalists" sought to free the government from 
that relationship. 
Cover dismisses this argument after a half-paragraph discus-
sion of one of its prominent exponents, William Jay (1789-1858), 
by showing that Jay's policies would not directly have abolished 
slavery in any state, since they admitted the right of a state to 
control its own institutions. While the criticism of this "federal 
consensus," as Wiecek calls it, is accurate, Cover does not apply 
its criterion of effectiveness to the Garrisonians or the constitu-
tional utopians. A parallel treatment of Jay and his colleagues 
would explicate and criticize their ideas. This course of action 
would have allowed Cover to consider whether a position "well 
within the mainstream of legal thought of the day" could criticize 
slavery without invoking natural law, or at least without invoking 
it in the manner of the constitutional utopians, and what contri-
bution such criticism had on judges.81 Cover's account of other 
positions is so stimulating that the absence of a full-scale treat-
ment of this one is a regrettable loss, especially since Fehren-
bacher's book is in effect an argument along Jay's lines. Failure 
to consider the moderate constitutionalist position makes the 
moral-formal dilemma more plausible, but raises doubts about 
that dilemma's adequacy as an explanation of judicial behavior. 
What we might call the Jay-Fehrenbacher position is a com-
monplace in areas of antebellum law outside slavery. Creative 
judicial interpretation of public policy, without reference to natu-
ral law, seems to have been the norm in cases involving economic 
development. In that area, acceptance of law as legislative com-
mand did not prevent judges from creatively reshaping legislative 
mandates. For over thirty years, legal hfatorians of the antebel-
lum years have been uncovering efforts to use law to promote 
socially desired changes in economic development, criminal law, 
and elsewhere. As Morton Horwitz says, "Law was no longer con-
ceived of as an eternal set of principles expressed in custom and 
derived from natural law."82 Rather, judges saw their actions as 
parallel with the legislature's in attaining such ends as economic 
development. Roger Taney's decision favoring new entrepreneurs 
in the Charles River Bridge case was typical in its explicit use of 
81. R. COVER, supra note 4, at 155. 
82. M. HoRwrrz, THE 'l'RANsFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1780-1860, at 30 (1977). See, 
e.g., 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE RoLE OF GOVERNMENT 
IN THE AlllErucAN ECONOMY: MAssACHUSE'ITS, 1774-1861 (rev. ed. 1969); J. HURST, LAW AND 
THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956). 
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policy considerations. 83 Policy arguments bulked large in numer-
ous decisions of Lemuel Shaw and other antebellum judges 
freeing railroads from liability to their injured employees, mini-
mizing damage awards against new spheres of transport, and pro-
moting ideas of contract, the market, and what Willard Hurst 
calls "the release of energy. "84 Antebellum courts, especially be-
fore the 1850s, seem to have followed the legislature's definitions 
of public policy: Although judges sometimes reached their con-
clusions before legislators acted, and often adjusted competing 
policy claims, they rarely ruled state laws unconstitutional. 85 As 
Cover says in another context, courts were sensitive, '~not only 
[to] what the legislature has said on a subject, but also what it. 
has intimated by nonaction or by action in related areas."88 In 
economic areas, antebellum judges seem to have been willing to 
scrap natural law with barely a second glance; since there seemed 
few conflicts within the judges' own minds between formal princi-
ples and natural law, they did not feel guilty. Judges could ignore 
natural law and embrace blatantly positivist principles without 
succumbing to judicial formalism. If positivist principles did not 
lead to formalism and guilt in economic areas, can they be 
blamed for creating formalism and guilt in another area? 
In slave cases, the direct evidence that judges felt guilty, let 
alone that they felt guilty because they accepted both formalism 
and morality, is slim. While Cover presents some evidence of 
this guilt and internal tension, he rightly admits that "[t]he 
evidence for a sense of guilt is admittedly indirect and uncer-
tain .... [and] somewhat ambiguous."87 Evidence that cogni-
tive dissonance escalated the formal stakes "must rest upon a 
tentative position consistent with all our evidence, but by no 
means proven by it. "88 Of the four judges that Cover examines, 
he says that "Joseph Story and his work may or may not exem-
plify the model constructed in this chapter";89 Lemuel "Shaw's 
opinions, though troubled, do not give as clearly evidenced recog-
83. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 419 (1837). A convenient compilation is S. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE 
AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RivER BRIDGE CASE (1971); a brief narrative 
treatment is R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN PoIJTICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE 
IT 65-67 (1948). 
84. J. HURST, supra note 82, at 3-32; see M. HORWITZ, supra note 82, chs. 1-7; L. LEVY, 
THE LAw OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW chs. 9, 10, 13, 14, 16 (1957). 
85. M. HORWITZ, supra note 82, at 259. 
86. R. COVER, supra note 4, at 105; see also M. HORWITZ, supra note 82, at 93. 
87. R. COVER, supra note 4, at 208 n. 
88. Id. at 231-32. 
89. Id. at 243. 
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nition of an either-or dichotomy as do those of McLean";90 Joseph 
Swan decided one of his two slave cases in the slave's favor with-
out apparent anguish, while the other was so atypical-with a 
background of rallies promoting civil war and gubernatorial 
threats of using troops, plus a Supreme Court decision very recent 
and "squarely on point" against freedom-that Swan had more 
to be anguished about than other Northern judges.91 The model 
does seem to fit John McLean, who was related by marriage to 
some abolitionists and politically supported by others.92 It is easy 
to see how a man in such a position could feel pulled in two 
directions, not so much by his inner commitment to two incom-
patible principles as by his loyalties to his profession and to his 
family and political supporters. Even here, though, the judge's 
most strenuous arguments were addressed to juries, where Cover 
says "there is much greater reason to discount them as reflective 
of a personal problem and more reflective of a purpose of persuad-
ing others who have moral doubts," or in response to abolitionist 
lawyers, where similar qualifications would obtain.93 Where psy-
chological nuances are concerned, the impression a passage leaves 
on a trained reader may be more accurate than an assemblage of 
exact quotations, and one must respect Cover's careful readings 
of appellate opinions. Still, there is room for a deeper exploration 
of judicial opinions to test Cover's conclusions about the tension 
between positive and natural law. 
Two cases decided by Lemuel Shaw in Massachusetts sug-
gest very preliminary lines of inquiry: Commonwealth v. Aves 
(1836) and Latimer's Case (1842). The cases are not devoid of 
support for Cover's position. In Aves, Shaw freed a slave brought 
into Massachusetts on a temporary visit; in Latimer, he refused 
to release an accused fugitive slave from custody. 94 Both cases 
seem to juxtapose natural right and state policy: in Aves, both 
urge freeing the slave; in Latimer, natural right urges freedom, 
while congressional policy urges enslavement. In Aves, according 
to Cover, Shaw relied on both natural right and the positive law 
of Massachusetts; Latimer required him to "ignore natural 
law."95 At the Latimer hearing, Shaw said "in substance," ac-
90. Id. at 251-52. 
91. Id. at 253-54. 
92. Id. at 246-49. 
93. Id. at 260, 247. 
94. Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836), discussed in L. LEVY, 
supra note 84, at 62-68; Latimer's Case, 5 L. Rep. 483 (Mass. 1843), discus.~ed in L. LEVY, 
supra note 84, at 78-85. 
95. R. COVER, supra note 4, at 94, 170. 
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cording to William Lloyd Garrison, that 
an appeal to natural rights and the paramount law of liberty was 
not pertinent! It was decided by the Constitution of the United 
States, and by the law of Congress, under that instrument, relating 
to fugitive slaves. These were to be obeyed, however disagreeable 
to our own natural sympathies and views of duty! . . . By the 
Constitution, the duty of returning runaway slaves was made im-
perative on the free states, and the act of Congress . . . was in 
accordance with the spirit of that instrument.95 
Such opposition between duty and nature seems to confirm 
Cover's reading. 
Yet the two cases could be read to minimize the opposition 
of natural and positive law, and hence to minimize the conflict 
among the values internalized by a particular judge. In Aves, 
Shaw did not ground freedom just on natural law, but on article 
I of the Massachusetts Constitution's Declaration of Rights, 
which he said was "precisely adapted to the abolition of negro 
slavery. "97 He construed the fugitive slave clause of the Federal 
Constitution strictly, in the manner of Jay or Fehrenbacher, say-
ing that it was intended "to fix as precisely as language could do 
it, the limit to which the rights of one party should be exercised 
within the territory of the other. " 98 Indeed, Shaw held that all 
nonfugitive slaves entering Massachusetts "become free, not so 
much because any alteration is made in their status, or condition, 
as because there is no law which will warrant, but there are laws 
. . . which prohibit, their forcible detention or forcible re-
moval. " 99 Although Shaw referred to natural law, his holding 
rested on positive law. The same approach, six years later, found 
positive law-there, the United States Constitution and the Fugi-
tive Slave Law-opposing the fugitive's claim. Unlike Cover's 
account, which fails to note that Shaw referred to specific Massa-
chusetts constitutional and legal provisions, this interpretation 
makes Shaw a consistent champion of positive law: he need not 
have balanced natural and positive law in his own mind as legiti-
mate grounds of decision. Why, then, in the Latimer hearing did 
he speak so passionately of natural rights? Not necessarily be-
cause he felt guilty, but because Garrison, who was present, inter-
rogated him about natural rights. The passage quoted above from 
96. L. LEVY, supra note 84, at 81 (quoting The Liberator, Nov. 4, 1842). 
97. 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 210, 217; see L. LEVY, supra note 84, at 65. 
98. 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 221; see L. LEVY, supra note 84, at 66. 
99. 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 217; compare the headnote at 193 stating that a slaveowner 
bringing a slave into Massachusetts "cannot restrain the slave of his liberty during his 
continuance here, and carry him out of this State against his consent." 
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the Liberator sounds like an answer to a question, and the hearing 
was in such informal surroundings (the jailor's parlor) as to en-
courage conversation.100 We need more evidence than Cover pro-
vides before we can reject the hypothesis that judges' comments 
about natural law were arguments addressed to the public and 
did not reflect judges' interior doubts. As noted above, even Cover 
admits that the evidence for guilt is indirect and ambiguous; he 
notes that judges' appeals to citizens to obey the laws might not 
reflect guilt, but "may be at least equally attributable to the need 
to convince hostile antagonists. " 101 
Cover's provocative questions require answers. On those an-
swers may depend our interpretation of the last century-and-a-
quarter of American jurisprudence, not to mention at least some 
of the jurisprudence to come. If the moral-formal dilemma, the 
tension between the moral commitment to natural law and the 
formal commitment to the profession, largely determined judges' 
actions, these actions would become less problematic as judges' 
respect for the profession grew and as the power of natural law 
waned. In effect, increasing professionalization would desensitize 
lawyers and judges to the moral claims of natural law. But if 
antebellum judges' actions flowed from their respect for legisla-
tive policy, not their own guilt, increasing professionalism might 
not directly impair moral judgment. Indeed, such professionalism 
might help undermine the legitimacy of legislatures, leaving pro-
fessions as the apparent best protectors of morality. 
Extending Cover's analysis would help clarify these points. 
Although most of the time he favors the cognitive-dis-
sonance/guilt explanation, he does occasionally suggest that judi-
cial deference to legislative positivism was a formal principle, 
hence opposed to natural law. That position, though, seems to 
make guilt unnecessary and cognitive dissonance superfluous. 
The ambiguities are tolerable for Cover's purposes, but if we are 
to put antebellum law into the context of professionalism, we will 
need to weigh more carefully the contribution of the inter-
nal-judges' own world views, their own mental loyalties, and 
especially their values and commitments to methods of decision-
making102-with the external-the relation between judges and 
100. L. LEVY, supra note 84, at 81. 
101. R. COVER, supra note 4, at 208 n.; cf. id. at 260 (reasonable to discount state-
ments made to jury as being "reflective of a purpose of persuading others who have moral 
doubts"). 
102. Cf. T. KUHN, supra note 50, at 182-87 (shared commitments, values, symbolic 
generalization, and exemplars create unanimous judgment among a community of spe-
cialists). 
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the larger society. We cannot be sure yet that the conflict within 
the legal profession between natural law and positivism made 
quite the difference that Cover has suggested. Yet the moral-
formal dilemma and cognitive dissonance may well constitute 
· part of a more complex account of antebellum judicial behavior 
and the morality of professionals. 
Change-of-Residence 
Although most of Cover's book deals with Northern judges, 
he finds the moral-formal dilemma south of the Mason-Dixon line 
as well. In both North and South, he says, judges had "a tendency 
. . . to speak of eternal principles of right" and "a concomitant 
tendency to reinforce their decisions by speaking of state policy." 
In the free states, natural right and public policy "led to the same 
conclusions, while in the South they required a delicate process 
of adjustment. " 103 He describes that adjustment for the important 
class of cases, like Dred Scott's, in which a slave, with the mas-
ter's permission, went to a free state, returned to a slave state, 
and later sued for freedom. Cover detects a change: Until the late 
1840s or the 1850s, Southern courts relied on natural law and 
freed such slaves; later, a combination of exasperation at aboli-
tionists and the practice of judicial professionalism made judges 
reverse themselves and consign slaves to bondage. 
In the earlier period, Cover maintains, Southern courts held 
that slavery was so repugnant to natural law that it could exist 
only by explicit, positive law; so slaves were freed when they, or 
their masters, established residence iµ a free state. Once free, 
they remained free even if they returned to their former home, for 
no slave state's law allowed the enslavement of free Northerners. 
Accepting the premise that slavery was contrary to natural right 
was basic: "In the Kentucky court's view [in Rankin v. Lydia], 
we find again the idea of a preexisting natural law in favor of 
freedom that is always subject to the superior authority of the 
sovereign, but that governs for want of the exercise of such au-
thority. " 10• This natural law approach "was generally reversed in 
the last ten or fifteen years before the Civil War. "105 
What overthrew natural law? Cover accepts as "the best de-
scription of the changeover and its rationale" a Note in the 
Columbia Law Review in 1971, "American Slavery and the Con-
103. R. COVER, supra note 4, at 93-94. 
104. Id. at 96. 
105. Id. at 97. 
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flict of Laws."108 That Note credits "the growth of sectional an-
tagonism" with some responsibility for the attack on natural law, 
and certainly the Missouri Supreme Court's statement in Dred 
Scott bears out this political and emotional dimension: 
Times now are not as they were when the former decisions on this 
subject were made. Since then not only individuals but States 
have been possessed with a dark and fell spirit in relation to slav-
ery, whose gratification is sought in the pursuit of measures, whose 
inevitable consequence must be the overthrow and destruction of 
our government. Under such circumstance, it does not behoove the 
State of Missouri to show the least countenance to any measure 
which might gratify this spirit.107 
But at the opposite pole, the Note credits judicial professionalism 
in the works of Joseph Story with dealing powerful blows at 
suprastate obligation. Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of 
Laws (1834) w~s one of many treatises he produced whose very 
existence helped build the legal profession and whose contents 
influenced judicial decisions. Story emphatically affirmed the 
unconstrained sovereign power of each state to decide what laws 
of other jurisdictions, if any, it would recognize: "[W]hatever 
force and obligation the laws of one country have in another, 
depends solely upon the laws, and municipal regulations of the 
latter .... "108 No overriding moral power, Story said, could com-
mand a state to recognize free or slave status achieved in another 
jurisdiction. While this doctrine liberated some slaves brought to 
the North, it seemingly permitted Southern courts to refuse to 
recognize the emancipatory effect of residence in free territory .109 
Thus the concept of a sophisticated professionalism combined 
with irrationality to strengthen the bonds of slavery. 
This interpretation gains strength from the occasions on 
which Southern judges quoted Story. The highest court in Ken-
tucky, for example, cited Story in support of the proposition that 
"it pertains to the sovereignty of every independent State, to 
determine for itself, and according to its own interests and policy, 
in what cases and to what extent the foreign law shall be adopted 
as a part of its own. . . . " 11° Cover and the Columbia Law Review 
106. Id. at 285 n.34 (citing Note, American Slavery and the Conflict of Laws, 71 
COLUM. L. REv. 74, 92-98 (1971)). 
107. Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 586 (1852), quoted in D. FEHRENBACIIER, supra 
note 8, at 264, and Note, supra note 106, at 97. The text as printed corrects minor errors 
of transcription in the Note and D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8. 
108. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAws § 23, at 24 (1st ed. Boston 
1834), quoted in R. COVER, supra no'te 4, at 84. 
109. Note, supra note 106, at 93-96. 
110. Collins v. America, 48 Ky. 565, 571 (1849). 
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Note certainly leave one with the impression that, about the time 
of the Mexican War, Southern courts changed their interpreta-
tions away from suprastate natural law to state sovereignty. For 
this shift, legal professionalism bore considerable responsibility. 
What overthrows this interpretation is Fehrenbacher's dem-
onstration that most Southern courts did not change their posi-
tion. One need not postulate an abandonment of natural law in 
order to explain continuity. What happened, Fehrenbacher main-
tains and independent reading of the cases cited in the Columbia 
Law Review confirms, is that the cases of the 1850s were factually 
distinguishable from those of the 1820s and 1830s. The same doc-
trines that freed earlier slaves enslaved later ones. The early cases 
involved slaves who established, with their owners' consent, per-
manent residence in the North; the latter dealt with slaves whose 
masters took them north for sojourns only, always intending to 
return to the slave state. In both periods, slaves were freed where 
change of permanent residence occurred, and not freed where 
domicile remained in the slave state. As Fehrenbacher adds, by 
the 1850s most masters knew enough about Northern law not to 
try taking their slaves north for permanent residence; the Dred 
Scott case, though decided in the 1850s, was based on events from 
the 1830s, and thus was something of an anachronism.111 
To support the claim of "abrupt reversal, "112 the author of 
American Slavery and the Conflict of Laws cites the Dred Scott 
case and three other cases; only Scott supports that reading. 
The other three cases were from.Kentucky: 
In 1848, the [Kentucky appeals] court . . . had held that a former 
slave who had lived in Ohio for two years was free and his return 
to Kentucky would not cause his former status to reattach. A year 
later, however, in Collins v. America, the court refused to declare 
free a slave who had spent an indeterminate period of time in a 
free state .... Later, the same court refused to recognize the 
validity of a declaration of freedom made on a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding in Pennsylvania. . . .113 
But a close reading of the cases shows that they differed as resi-
dence differs from sojourn. In the 1848 case, Davis v. Tingle, the 
plaintiff resided two years in Ohio, and the court held, "By his 
residence in Ohio, the plaintiff became free, and being once free, 
his return to this State did not make him again a slave. "114 In the 
111. D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 55-61. 
112. Note, supra note 106, at 97. 
113. Id. 
114. Davis v. Tingle, 47 Ky. 539, 545 (1848). 
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1849 case, the slave remained in Ohio "a short time, (about two 
weeks or less,)" on one occasion, and "a few days" on another. 
Although the court cited Story in maintaining that only Ken-
tucky law governed whether to free the alleged slaves, it retained 
the holding of Davis: a sojourning slave remained a slave, a 
change of permanent residence produced freedom.tu 
If America [the slave] was sent to Ohio as her home ... or for 
the purpose of being free, or under any circumstances which 
should, in reason and justice, identify her with the institutions of 
Ohio, she became free by operation of the fundamental law of that 
State, as soon as she entered its territory. And we perceive no 
principle of policy, or of public interest, or of justice, which would 
require the maintenance of the owner's right in this State, upon 
her subsequent return, under the impulse of her own free voli-
tion.116 
The last case, Maria v. Kirby, involved a slave staying three or 
four days on a "trip of pleasure," and even those days may have 
been due to an unexpected delay.117 Only the Missouri Supreme 
Court in the Dred Scott case reached a conclusion different from 
its own prior case law, which had upheld the distinction between 
residence and sojourn. Fehrenbacher's analysis of that case sug-
gests that special political pressures surrounding the defeat of 
Senator Thomas Hart Benton contributed to the unique Mis-
souri result. 118 
Thus the alleged overthrow of natural law, the abrupt change 
to ignoring out-of-state emancipation, is not proved and, in fact, 
seems not to have generally happened. Fehrenbacher's conclusion 
is unambiguous: "Except in Missouri, as a result of the Dred 
Scott case, there appears to have been no decision of a Southern 
appellate court that denied a suit for freedom in a clear-cut case 
of permanent residence ori free soil. " 119 But as the careful qualifi-
cations in that conclusion suggest, Fehrenbacher's account is not 
quite definitive. He is technically correct, for example, in dis-
counting a Mississippi case, Mitchell v. Wells, on the ground that 
it was not a suit for freedom: The court refused to let a slave who 
had moved to Ohio for permanent residence sue in Mississippi to 
recover a legacy. But the court declared that it would not recog-
nize the change of a slave's status outside Mississippi, and the 
115. Collins v. America, 48 Ky. 565, 565-66, 571-72, 572-73 (1849). 
116. Collins v. America, 48 Ky. 565, 575 (1849). 
117. Maria v. Kirby, 51 Ky. 542 (1851). 
118. D. F'EHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 258-60, 262-65. 
119. Id. at 60. 
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natural inference from that statement is that the court would not 
have recognized out-of-state emancipation in a suit for freedom.120 
A more searching question would not be whether or not 
Southern courts changed, but whether legal professionalism con-
tributed to whatever happened. Even though the Missouri and 
Mississippi courts quoted Story on sovereignty,121 the dissenting 
opinions were the more professional. In Missouri, Judge Hamilton 
Gamble reviewed the state precedents and showed that they com-
pelled a decision that residence, but not sojourn, in free territory 
brought freedom; the Missouri court's majority responded with 
political arguments about "the dark and fell spirit in relation to 
slavery."122 In Mitchell v. Wells, the Mississippi dissenter drew 
careful distinctions between emancipation with and without a 
will and affirmed the validity of several previous state court deci-
sions.123 His opponents constituting the court's majority chal-
lenged those decisions, blurred his distinctions, and proclaimed 
that public policy was not to be found solely from legislatures and 
constitutions, but also from "the manners, customs, and habits 
of our people; our climate, soil, and productions."m Here at least, 
professionalism promoted emancipation. There is some possibil-
ity that a deeper investigation would show that Joseph Story's 
professionalism contributed to enslavement, but the easily acces-
sible evidence suggests that it did not. Both analyses would be 
refined by inquiring about the effects of professionalism, but the 
clear import of Fehrenbacher's discussion is that professionalism 
supported the morally preferable position. 
V 
Neither Cover nor Fehrenbacher claims to have solved the 
problem of professionalism: each author tends to assume his vi-
sion of the concept, rather than articulating and examining it 
directly. But students of American law, historians and practition-
ers alike, may take these two works as a point of departure for 
study more closely focussed on the relations between professions 
and morality. 
One assumption that the two authors share is that irrational-
120. Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235, 249 (i859). 
121. Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 583 (1852); Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235, 251 
(1859). 
122. Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 586 (1852), quoted in text at note 107 supra; see 
D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 264. 
123. 37 Miss. 235, 269-71, 266-69 (Handy, J., dissenting). 
124. 37 Miss. at 257, 251 (majority opinion). 
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ity promoted aggression. Cover adopts essentially the same psy-
chological model as did Charles Sellers, Jr., in his influential 
article, The Travail of Slavery: Conflict among values pro-
duces confusion that is resolved through aggression. 12• Cover's 
"moral-formal dilemma" draws on more recent social psycholo-
gists than Seller's "fundamental moral anarchy," and they de-
scribe different groups of antebellum Americans, but Cover 
would share Sellers's comment: "[l]t was the very conflict of 
values, rendered intolerable by constant criticism premised on 
values [they] ... shared" that produced the changes each au-
thor describes. 128 Cover's Northern judges resemble Sellers's 
Southerners, and the combination recalls David Donald's de-
scription of antebellum Americans: 
increasingly unable to arrive at reasoned, independent judg-
ments. . . . Huddling together in their loneliness, they sought 
only to escape their freedom. Fads, fashions, and crazes swept the 
country .... Hysterical fears and paranoid suspicions marked 
this shift of Americans to "other-directedness." Never was there a 
field so fertile before the propagandist, the agitator, the extre-
mist.127 
Fehrenbacher, too, finds emotionalism and irrationality. "Anger, 
wounded pride, and a half-suppressed panic" were pushing 
Southerners in the 1850s "to the edge of hysteria." Later, "the 
Southern mood" becomes "fearful, angry, and defiant. "128 The 
presence of an antislavery minority "heightened the feeling of 
insecurity" among Missouri slaveowners. The sectional conflict 
became "an independent emotional force." 129 Thus the two books 
implicitly carry on the task set by A.E. Keir Nash nearly a decade 
ago: using appellate opinions to test the interpretation of Sellers 
(and, inferentially, Donald) that conflicts of values produced 
emotion and aggression. If judges insulated by long terms and 
high prestige evinced value-conflict and aggression, ordinary 
Americans a fortiori might be presumed to have done so; if not, 
either ordinary Americans were more humane than legend 
claimed, or judges' professional roles promoted humanity.130 Nei-
ther book directly addresses Nash's problem; both presume its 
relevance. The two authors come close to recapitulating divergent 
125. Sellers, supra note 49, at 67-69, 67 n. 
126. Id. at 67; R. CoVER, supra note 4, at 226-29. 
127. D. DONALD, LINCOLN RECONSIDERED 229-30 (enlarged ed. 1961). 
128. D. F'EHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 165, 337. 
129. Id. at 258, 508. 
130. Nash, A More Equitable Past? Southern Supreme Courts and the Protection of 
the Antebellum Negro, 48 N.C. L. REv. 197, 237-40 (1970). 
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accounts of McCarthyism in the early 1950s. Just as Michael P. 
Rogin blamed the phenomenon on fear, and some calculation, 
among political elites, Cover locates the relevant irrationality 
among judges, especially antislavery judges. Somewhat as 
Richard Hofstadter blamed McCarthyism, in large part, on root-
less status-strivers and "the less-educated members of the middle 
classes," Fehrenbacher locates the relevant irrationality among 
Southerners in general, and especially voters in Missouri (al-
though he makes Southern congressmen, senators, and newspa-
per editors emotionally involved as well) .131 
It would be reassuring to conclude that professionalism with-
stood irrationality, from whatever source derived, and Fehren-
bacher does make a strong case that the dissenting Justices did 
resist the emotionalism of Missourians and of Taney. There is 
independent evidence, as in Mitchell v. Wells, to the same effect. 
As we move into the 1980s, we will often find ourselves in discus-
sions about the moral effects of professionalism. Anyone who 
doubts the relevance of an academic monograph of over seven 
hundred pages to such immediate concerns should ponder Feh-
renbacher's book. By making a strong case that fearless profes-
sional independence was the best support of antislavery con-
science, it offers a powerful defense of professionalism_ in the con-
temporary world. The deeper one probes Justice Accused, the 
less persuasive it appears. The deeper one probes The Dred Scott 
Case, the more persuasive it appears. Since the acids of relativ-
ism have eaten away so many moral conventions, it may be that 
sophisticated professional standards are the best insurance that 
justice be done and conscience honored.132 
None of this denies that the interdisciplinary breadth and 
excitement of Cover's approach may yield valuable results. At the 
moment, his major formulations strike this reviewer as brilliantly 
suggestive rather than persuasive, but more detailed work might 
make them convincing. Developing the social interpretation of 
Billy Budd would illuminate both books, for Fehrenbacher em-
phasizes emotion so much as a foil for professionalism that he 
masks the elements of economic and social rationality behind 
Southern whites' defense of slavery. Eugene Genovese may be 
131. M. RoGIN, THE INTELLECTUALS AND McCARTHY: THE RADICAL SPECTER 31, 215-17, 
248-56 (1967); R. HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 51, 44 (1965); see also id. at 83. 
132. For a concise statement of the problem, see E. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH 
DESTINY: A HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN REFORM 345-46 (rev. ed., abridged, 1956); for 
an application to historians, see J. HEXTER, DOING HISTORY 77-106 (1971). 
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right in seeing the masters as extremely rational defenders of an 
economic and social system that "was the foundation of a special 
civilization imprinted with their own character, " 133 rather than 
mere irrational, emotionally crippled victims. Perhaps neutral 
professional standards of construction and craft could withstand 
irrationality, but not rationality; could withstand the storms of 
psychology but not the cold wind of economics and social rela-
tions. To the extent that these economic and social concerns 
imply that poorly educated judges from lower socioeconomic 
backgrounds should have been less emancipatory than educated 
aristocrats, they are not entirely consistent with Nash's prelimi-
nary findings that deny that "red-neck authoritarianism" fol-
lowed Jacksonian democracy.134 Still, invoking these harsher real-
ities might illuminate some areas now left obscure. Granting that 
antebellum judges favored legislative command over natural law, 
for example, why did they interpret public policy so imagina-
tively in economic cases and so narrowly in slave cases? Did they 
act because they, like Vere, benefitted from existing social ar-
rangements, or because those arrangements, including whites' 
domination of blacks in all parts of the country, warped their 
vision? 
Here as elsewhere, subtler and more extensive readings of the 
evidence are required. More studies of the caliber of Fehren-
bacher's and Cover's, posing questions sharply and digging fur-
ther into the mass of relevant materials, should improve our 
knowledge of the problems they raise. The Dred Scott Case and 
Justice Accused remind us that the relations between profession-
alism and integrity remain incompletely charted. 
133. E. GENOVESE, supra note 62, at 270. 
134. Nash, Fairness and Formalism in the Trials of Blacks in the State Supreme 
Courts of the Old South, 56 VA. L. REv. 64, 94-96, quotation at 96 (1970). 
